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The Myth of "Lucky" Patent Verdicts:
Improving the Quality of Appellate Review by
Incorporating Fuzzy Logic in Jury Verdicts
MICHAEL T. NGUYEN*




Patent jury verdicts resemble lottery jackpot winnings in a multitude
of ways.' For many years, commentators have lamented the
unpredictable nature of patent jury verdicts.' The damages awards of
these patent verdicts, like lottery jackpots, are measured in the millions
of dollars. For example, in a recent patent case, Verizon v. Vonage, the
jury awarded Verizon $58 million in damages.4 For better or for worse,
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A., Southwestern
University, 2003. I am grateful to Professors Margreth Barrett and Jeffrey Lefstin for their valuable
feedback and comments throughout the writing process. This Note received the 2o07 Robert C.
Watson Award from the American Intellectual Property Law Association. Many thanks to the authors
cited in this Note whose work sparked my fascination with patents, fuzziness, and juries. Special
thanks to my friends and family for their love, encouragement, and support over the years. Lastly, I
would like to thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work. All errors are my
own.
I. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (David Francis Pears ed., 1985).
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was a British author, mathematician and philosopher.
2. When I hear news of massive patent verdicts awarded by juries I cannot help but associate the
multi-million dollar judgments with lottery jackpot winnings. See Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White
Knight' Draws Cries of 'Patent Blackmail,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 199o, at F5 (calling a jury trial of a
patent case "a 'judicial lottery,' an often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those
who are sufficiently aggressive").
3. The jury's role in patent litigation has sparked extensive scholarly debate and increasing
skepticism. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE 107 (1992) (discussing problems in patent jury trials); Fourth Biennial Patent System Major
Problems Conference, 34 IDEA 77 (1994) (including debate by twenty-nine prominent patent
practitioners and professors about the role of the jury in patent cases). As Judge Nies stated in her
dissent in In re Lockwood: "No more important nor contentious an issue arises in patent law
jurisprudence than the appropriate role of juries in patent litigation." In re Lockwood, 5o F.3 d 966,
98o-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 0995).
4. See Jury Orders Vonage to Pay $58 Million to Verizon in Patent Case, Fox NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007,
[12571
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
individual jurors, selected at random, wield a considerable amount of
power in patent trials5 even though "'blue-ribbon' or expert juries are not
mandated, regardless of technical complexity."6
Under the Constitution, civil litigants are guaranteed the right to a
jury trial regardless of whether one party objects.7 Uncertainty pervades
the law, but a particular concept of patent law-the doctrine of
equivalents-incorporates uncertainty as a core element." The doctrine
of equivalents derives from the equitable tradition of protecting legal
rights "from abuse by a too-narrow application of the law causing an
unjust result."9 However, the Federal Circuit sitting en banc proclaimed
that the doctrine has become "a virtually uncontrolled and unreviewable
license to juries to find infringement if they so choose."'" The Supreme
Court has reiterated that the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact
to be decided by the jury," even though claim construction remains a
question of law.' Often, juries lack the necessary aids to return coherent,
consistent, and correct verdicts when applying the doctrine of equivalents
to means-plus-function claims. 3
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,257947,oo.html?sPage=fnc/scitech/innovation. Other recent
patent jury verdicts also illustrate this point. See, e.g., $51 Million Awarded to Plaintiff, Judge Later
Reverses Verdict, in MEALEY'S JURY VERDICTS & SETTLEMENT 357 (2005); A Suit for Patent Infringement
of Cellular Telephone and Base Station Technology, in NORTH TEXAs REPORTS (2002) (awarding $61.25
million to patent owners); A Suit for Patent Infringement Re Process Used to Encapsulate
Semiconductors in Plastic, in NORTH TEXAS REPORTS (1995) (calculating the damages owed by three
defendants totaled over $51.8 million); Exchange-Enabling Technology Dispute Decided by Jury, in
MEALEY'S JURY VERDICTS & SETTLEMENT (2o06) (awarding a $5.8 million plaintiff verdict); Prius,
Highlander Infringe Hybrid Patents, Jury Finds, in MEALEY'S JURY VERDICTS & SETrLEMENT 36o (2005)
(awarding $4.6 million in damages).
5. See infra Part III.
6. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 372 (2oo). Lotteries are also controlled by random probability.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who's Asking?, IT
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 852 (2002) ("A jury adjudicates a case if either party demands one at the
outset of the litigation." (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 38(b))).
8. An accused product infringes under the doctrine of equivalents if it (I) "performs
substantially the same function," (2) "in substantially the same way," (3) "to obtain the same result" as
a particular claim element. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38-40
(1997) (citing Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878)). Asking five jurors to define what
"substantially the same" means will yield five different, uncertain responses.
9. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
Io. Id. at 1538.
I1. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8.
12. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) ("We hold that the construction
of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.").
13. The means-plus-function style of claims drafting is provided by 35 U.S.C. § 112 91 6, which
reads:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support
thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
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The bulk of the research in studying the competency of patent juries
has revolved around empirical studies of litigated cases and surveys of
the jurors, judges, and attorneys involved in the cases.'4 Not surprisingly,
the studies have shown that judges are "subtler at managing the complex
nature of patent cases and the technical distinctions between patents and
products."' 5 Juries, on the other hand, tend to favor the patent holder
and rely heavily on the United States Patent and Trademark Office's
patent validity determination. 6 Regardless, juries seem to be as
competent as judges in deciding patent infringement cases based on
outcome data and appellate affirmance rates." However, the author
notes that
[t]he problem with using outcome data and appellate affirmance rate
as a measure of juror competency may lie in the lack of transparency of
black-box jury verdicts combined with deferential standards of review.
It may be that the appellate affirmance rate and outcome data do not
tell the whole story.'
Many practicing patent litigators view the modern jury as the last
resort for resolving disputes between parties because of the
unpredictability of human nature and the growing complexity of patent
disputes.'9 Some commentators have tried to address and remedy this
problem of juror confusion. While their reforms might improve the
See also In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The plain and unambiguous meaning
of paragraph six is that one construing means-plus-function language in a claim must look to the
specification and interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent that the specification provides such
disclosure."). This drafting method allows the drafter to describe a structure in a claim functionally
without reciting its structure in the claim, relying instead on the corresponding structure described in
the specification and its "equivalents thereof." See generally Bryan K. Wheelock & Evan R. Sotiriou,
35 U.S.C. § 12, f 6-Means for Better Patent Protection, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. lO65 (2oo3). Applying
the doctrine of equivalence to means-plus-function terms can be a daunting task for juries and has the
potential to cause much confusion. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc.,
145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cit. 1998) (analyzing whether a means-plus-function term could be infringed
under the doctrine of equivalence when the Court had already determined, through claim
construction, that the accused device was not an equivalent structure to the corresponding structure in
the specification). How can we expect lay persons to understand this complex idea without some help?
14. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 237, 245
(2oo6) (noting that "[m]ost previous work on patent litigation, in fact, has concentrated on the small
proportion of cases that go to trial"); Moore, supra note 6, at 383 ("Surprisingly, few patent cases go to
trial each year.").
15. Moore, supra note 6, at 368.
16. Id. at 392.
17. Id. at 409.
18. Id.
19. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 14, at 272 (noting that "the majority of patent cases terminate in
some form of non-adjudicated agreement"); Moore, supra note 7, at 857 ("Parties are unlikely to
spend millions of dollars litigating disputes and not research which adjudicator may favor them. Even
if the party is not a repeat player, generally the attorneys who litigate patent cases are familiar with the
litigation process and jury behavioral patterns.").
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accuracy of some verdicts, the suggested changes overlook a fundamental
flaw in all patent jury verdicts-the individual juror's inability to express
uncertainty in the decision-making process." However, the jury can be a
reliable mechanism for fact finding in patent disputes if given tools that
will allow them to express their own uncertainty in the matter. Some
commentators have suggested that we pay patent jurors a higher rate in
return for a higher quality and better-educated jury.' While I do not
disagree, this Note's proposal allows the individual juror the opportunity
to be honest about his or her own uncertainty about the issue instead of
compromising their beliefs to yield a crisp "yes or no" answer.
While others have criticized the current system and suggested the
creation of a new procedural mechanism to determine the validity of
patents,2 I propose a modest change to improve the current system.
Kimberly A. Moore, a recently appointed Federal Circuit judge, has
suggested that the Federal Circuit mandate the use of special verdict
forms for patent jury trials to increase the transparency of the verdicts. 3
This Note extends that proposal by introducing fuzzy logic into special
patent jury verdict forms to improve the quality of appellate review.
Fuzzy logic, a relatively new mathematical concept, has emerged
over the past few decades as an effective tool to model complexity and
uncertainty. 4 In a nutshell, fuzzy logic recognizes that truth is not always
black or white, but rather, truth can be measured in shades of gray. 5
Fuzzy logic has been utilized extensively in consumer electronics,
including air conditioners, copy machines, rice cookers, and washing
machines. 6
In this Note, I propose a "fuzzy" special verdict form and procedure
for "defuzzifying" the verdict that would allow the jury the freedom to
20. Commentators have broken down the complex equivalence inquiry into simple yes/no
responses in jury instructions. See Lindsay M. Beyer, Note, Still Beating the Dead Horse: Eliminating
Redundant Analyses and Inconsistent Judgments for Means-Plus-Function Claims, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
499, 522-23; Tony Caliendo, Comment, A Proposed Solution to Jury Confusion in Patent Infringement
Cases Involving Means-Plus-Function Claims, 2004 BYU L. REV. 209, 227-31 (2004). While this would
force the jury to specify their reasoning, it avoids the uncertainty issue altogether.
21. Moore, supra note 7, at 849.
22. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, io9th Cong. (2005) (calling for the expansion of
post-issuance reexamination and opposition proceedings).
23. See Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 Hous. L. REV.
779, 797 (2002) [hereinafter Moore, Lack of Transparency]; Judicial Nominations-Judge Kimberly A.
Moore, http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/infocusljudicialnominees/moore.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). It
remains to be seen whether Judge Moore, who was confirmed on September 5, 2006. can convince the
Federal Circuit to create such a mandate.
24. Lotfi Zadeh invented the term "fuzzy logic" in 1964. See DANIEL McNEILL & PAUL
FREIBERGER, Fuzzy LOGIC 15 (1993). Bart Kosko is the author of an accessible treatise on "Fuzzy
Logic" for non-scientists. See generally BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF Fuzzy
LOGIC (1993).
25. Id. at 4 ("Fuzziness is grayness.").
26. Id. at 184-87.
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express uncertainty, add transparency to jury verdicts for reviewing
courts to clarify the hotly disputed issues, and present an accurate
depiction of the jury's verdict. Of course, the fuzzy special verdict form
will not give juries carte blanche to circumvent their constitutional duty
and avoid making a decision regarding factual findings. Rather, the
process of "defuzzification" described in this Note will transform the
fuzzy verdict into a crisp set of factual findings.
Patent law provides a good case study because the underlying legal
concepts are fuzzy, and the number of patent jury trials is skyrocketing."
Finding doctrine of equivalents infringement on a means-plus-function
claim poses a significantly complex problem to juries and even some
lawyers such that clarification through the use of a new interdisciplinary
approach would probably be helpful. Moreover, the popular belief that
jury decision making is prone to bias, incompetence, and other tangential
factors leads me to address this very confusing issue in patent law to
prove a point: fuzzy logic may help to simplify the jurors' comprehension
of complex real-world problems.
Applying fuzzy logic to legal concepts, interestingly, is not new.
Many legal scholars have already used fuzzy logic in very diverse
contexts.2 Fuzzy logic has been used to model complex rules in
bankruptcy law. 9 Additionally, fuzzy logic has the added appeal of being
able to break down uncertain ideas into quantifiable and computable
values to render a more accurate reflection of the underlying
uncertainty."s Few would disagree that the law and uncertainty, or
vagueness, go hand in hand.'
In Part I, I give a brief introduction to fuzzy logic while keeping in
mind the intended audience for this Note. In Part II, I describe a unique
issue in patent law: the application of the doctrine of equivalents to
means-plus-function claim limitations. In Part III, I discuss the role of the
27. Moore, Lack of Transparency, supra note 23, at 780.
28. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert
Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (i99); Edward S. Adams &
Torben Spaak, Fuzzifying the Natural Law-Legal Positivist Debate, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 95-99
(1995); Edward S. Adams et al., Wedding Carlson and Schwartz: Understanding Secured Credit as a
Fuzzy System, 80 VA. L. REV. 2233, 2236-47 (1994); Walter A. Effross, Bright Lines or Blurry Labels?:
Interpreting the "Fuzzy Logic" of Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 141, t49 (1998); David
A. Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 B.U. L. REv. 825, 865-69
(1986) (applying fuzzy logic to evidence and inference); Williams, supra note 29; Charles M. Yablon,
On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Corporate Law: An Essay on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 504-18 (i9i).
29. See Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied
to Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1403,
1448-70 (1994) (using fuzzy logic to approximate good faith payments).
30. See KosKo, supra note 24, at 172 ("You can't hand a fuzzy set to a motor. You have to tell the
motor a speed. You have to give it a number.").
31. I would argue that the fuzzy nature of law provides "wiggle room" for lawyers.
May 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
modem jury in patent trials and the perceived problems with juror
incompetence. Then, in Part IV, I propose a sample special verdict form
that incorporates fuzzy concepts as well as a procedure for "defuzzifying"
the data into a crisp decision. Lastly, I anticipate criticisms, problems,
and concerns regarding the use of this new mathematical concept and
will address each briefly in Part V of this Note.
Although this Note focuses on patent law as a case study, fuzzy
special verdict forms might prove useful in other areas of the law. I hope
that this Note will spark research, discussion, and more application of
fuzzy logic theory in the legal community.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO Fuzzy LOGIC
Lotfi Zadeh invented the term "fuzzy logic" in 1964, and published
his paper, "Fuzzy Sets,"32 in 1965. "At the heart of fuzzy logic lies a
question that goes to the nub of thought: What is a class?"33 Fuzzy logic
fundamentally differs from classical logic because of the concept of
multivalence. Webster's Dictionary defines "multivalence" as "the
quality or state of having many values, meanings, or appeals.
34
Multivalent logic, as a result, is premised on the recognition that few
things in life are black or white, but rather shades of gray. Bivalent logic,
or binary logic, sees the world as true or false; right or wrong; all or
nothing. In a sense, bivalent logic "trades accuracy for simplicity."35
Fuzziness fills the gap between these extremes.
For example, a fuzzy interpretation of the statement, "My lawn is
green," views the statement as a half-truth or partially true. 6 Fuzziness
attempts to represent the world around us precisely as it is, not a
rounded-off, bivalent view of it. Thus, multivalent logic, cursed with the
moniker "fuzzy" logic, is not fuzzy at all, but rather more precise and
revealing about the exact state of the affairs.
A. FIRST THINGS FIRST: MATHEMATICAL FUNDAMENTALS
Before introducing fuzzy concepts, one must have a grasp of classical
logic and set theory. Classical, Boolean, or "binary" logic requires the
truth value to be "I" (when the statement is true) or "o" (when the
statement is false).37 Binary logic forces the world to be either A or not-
A. For example, the statement "John is tall" is either true or false and
32. McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24; Lotfi A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 INFO. & CONTROL 338
(1965).
33. McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 23.
34. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 750 (1979).
35. KosKo, supra note 24, at 21.
36. Id. at 26.
37. See generally George Boole, The Calculus of Logic, 3 CAMBRIDGE & DUBLIN MATHEMATICAL J.
183 (1848), available at http://www.maths.tcd.ie/pub/HistMath/People/Boole/CalcLogic/CalcLogic.pdf.
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THE MYTH OF "LUCKY" PA TENT VERDICTS
will be assigned a truth value of "I" or 0."
Set theory is "the mathematical science of the infinite.""3 Sets are
"fundamental objects that can be used to define all other concepts in
mathematics."39 The language of set theory relies on one "fundamental
relation" called membership.4' An element A is said to be in set B (also
denoted A F B). For example, let T be the set of tall people. If the
statement "John is tall" is true, then John is in set T. Thus, T is a "crisp"
set because membership is either full or null.'
Two simple functions operate on classical sets: intersection and
union.4" The intersection of two sets is the set of only those elements that
have membership in each of the two sets. The union of the two sets is the
set of all elements in both sets. For example, let T be the set of tall
people and S be the set of slim people, such that T = (John, Ben, Franc)
and S = fBen, Franc, Paul. 3 Then, the intersection set, T fl S, would be
(Ben, Franc), and the union set, T u S, would be {John, Ben, Franc,
Paul).'
B. Fuzzy SETS, RULES, AND SYSTEMS
"Fuzzy logic" is reasoning with fuzzy sets.45 Bart Kosko refers to the
"fuzzy principle" in stating that "everything is a matter of degree.46
Instead of using the crisp truth values "I" and "o," fuzzy logic uses truth
values as fractions from o to I.4" Thus, the statement "John is tall" can be
66% true, and John would have a membership value of o.66 in the fuzzy
set of tall people. When using these percentages, fuzzy logicians do not
imply that probability or chance is involved.'8 It would not make sense to
say that John has a 66% chance of being tall or that my lawn has an 89%
probability of being green.
To illustrate a fuzzy set further, let us look again at the green lawn




41. Full membership means complete membership, whereas null membership means the element
is not a member of that set.
42. Boole, supra note 37.
43. Brackets "[ ... ]" signify a set. Elements are separated by commas.
44. The intersection operator (n) is known as "and," while the union operator (U) is known as
"or" in Boolean. See Boole, supra note 37. In plain English, Ben and Franc comprise the set of tall and
slim people. John, Ben, Franc, and Paul comprise the set of tall or slim people.
45. For a more in-depth and interesting explanation of the intricacies of fuzzy logic written for a
legal audience, see Adams & Spaak, supra note 28.
46. KoSKO, supra note 24, at 18.
47. Id. at 19.
48. See id at 149 ("Zadeh used numbers between o and I to describe vagueness or matters of
degree. Probabilists felt they did the same thing. A fight was inevitable.... Zadeh took a pounding
from the probability school."); see also MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 186, 193.
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example. Few lawns are ioo% green. Often, a lawn contains a few brown
or yellow patches. Thus, the word "green," in the context of lawns, stands
for a fuzzy set of colors that constitute green. "We think in fuzzy sets and
we each define our fuzzy boundaries in different ways and with different
examples."'49 While the definition of these boundaries may differ from
person to person, "the very looseness of the fuzzy set enhances its
expressiveness. '50 So, while I may make the statement, "My lawn is
green," in reality, my lawn might be 89% green, or may have a
membership value of 0.89 in the fuzzy set of green lawns, because of a
few yellow and brown spots. Most people round up to ioo% as a matter
of convenience.'
Fuzzy reasoning requires the creation of fuzzy rules in the form of
"if-then" statements.52 The fuzzy "if-then" rules express the relation
between fuzzy sets. " By combining fuzzy rules, we can create a fuzzy
system that automatically converts inputs into outputs.' Building a fuzzy
system can be done in three steps: first, select the inputs and outputs of
the system; second, pick the fuzzy sets; and third, choose the fuzzy rules.5
My favorite illustration of a fuzzy system of fuzzy rules is the
washing machine example. 6 Suppose we want to construct a machine
that "'knows' to wash dirtier clothes for a longer duration than clothes
which are relatively clean."57 The "input is the degree of dirtiness and
[the] output is the duration of the wash.,18 The fuzzy inputs would be:
almost completely clean, relatively clean, slightly dirty, dirty, and very
dirty. The fuzzy outputs would be: rinse, wash lightly, wash, wash
thoroughly, and wash vigorously. Finally, we choose the fuzzy rules: (I) if
the clothes are almost completely clean, then only rinse them; (2) if the
clothes are relatively clean, then they are lightly washed; (3) if the clothes
are slightly dirty, then they are washed; (4) if the clothes are dirty, then
they are washed thoroughly; (5) if the clothes are very dirty, then they
are washed vigorously. 9
49. KoSKO, supra note 24, at 122.
50. Adams & Spaak, supra note 28, at 95.
5I . KosKo, supra note 24, at I5o ("For most of us when we say that a man is tall we don't mean it
in the sense of a bingo game. His tallness is deterministic. It is a property of his being. It is a matter of
degree.").
52. Id. at 155 ("A group of sentences gives a fuzzy system. In the simplest case someone tells you
the sentences. They give you their expert advice or rules of thumb or common sense. A fuzzy system
takes this knowledge and models the world with it.").
53. Id. at 292. Each rule defines a "fuzzy patch," the product of fuzzy sets X and Y. Wider fuzzy
sets yield more uncertain fuzzy patches. Id.
54. Adams & Spaak, supra note 28, at ioI.
55. Id.
56. Perhaps it is because I hate doing laundry.
57. Adams & Spaak, supra note 28, at tot.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 102.
[Vol. 59:I1257
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This fuzzy system can be "defuzzified" by attaching specific numbers
to the vague concepts.6 Fuzzy concepts can be defuzzified by averaging
or finding the centroid (i.e., center of mass) of the output numbers.•
Defining dirtiness as a range of particles of dirt from io to ioo and
duration of the wash from io to ioo minutes, we can assign certain values
to our fuzzy sets.2 Thus, the washing machine will literally think for itself
and determine how long to wash laundry based on how dirty it is.6" Such
products have been developed in Japan "to raise the machine IQ of
camcorders and transmissions and vacuum sweepers and hundreds of
other devices and systems."
64
C. APPLICATIONS OF Fuzzy LOGIC IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT
An interesting application of fuzzy logic can be found in bankruptcy
law. 6' Walter Effross writes that "[i]n keeping with the equitable nature
of the bankruptcy court, the [Bankruptcy] Code grants bankruptcy
judges great discretion and other than specifying various deadlines,
imposes few absolute mathematical constraints."6 Courts have relied on
hermeneutic methods when using many key expressions and concepts the
Bankruptcy Code does not formally define.6 , "Fuzzy logic provides a
flexible means of defining in practice, concepts whose numerical
parameters are not specified by the Bankruptcy Code .... 61
Good faith is definitely a fuzzy concept. Researchers have found
"significant differences" in the number of personal bankruptcy petitions,
because different local legal cultures might define a core term such as
"good faith" in varying degrees.69 Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans must
provide for payment to unsecured creditors for at least the amount that
they would have received in the Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor.7
60. KOSKO, supra note 24 ("You defuzzify a set when you replace it with a number or centroid.").
61. Id.
62. Adams & Spaak, supra note 28, at 102, illus. 4-5. The ranges for particles of dirt in clothing
were assigned to the words: almost completely clean (o to io), relatively clean (so to 30), slightly dirty
(30 to 6o), dirty (60 to 8o), and very dirty (80 to 90). The duration of the wash in minutes was
associated to the fuzzy sets as follows: rinse (so to 20), wash lightly (20 to 40), wash (40 to 70), wash
thoroughly (70 to 9o), and wash vigorously (90 to ioo). Id. Of course, these values were arbitrarily
assigned. These fuzzy rules create fuzzy patches that can be programmed into fuzzy chips. See id. at
103-04.
63. The author could use a washing machine like this. See generally Press Release, GE Consumer
& Industrial Press Room, New GE Fuzzy Logic Front-Loading Washing Machine Cares for Wash
"INTELLI-GENTLY" (Apr. 23, 2001), available at http://www.geconsumerproducts.com/
pressroom/press-releases/appliances/worldwide/fzzyfrntld.htm.
64. KosKo, supra note 24, at 71, 157.
65. See, e.g., Adams & Farber, supra note 28; Effross, supra note 28.
66. Effross, supra note 28 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 1SO.
68. Id. at 149.
69. Id. at 153-54.
70. See ii U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000).
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"[I1f a 'no-asset' debtor has no non-exempt assets to distribute in a
chapter 7 proceeding, she could theoretically provide a 'o%' plan, which
would not pay general unsecured creditors at all."" However, Chapter 13
trustees and judges effectively deter o% plans by keeping most plans
above a floor percent that varies widely." Lawyers can argue to confirm
plans with a percentage below the floor if they can convince the court
that the debtor cannot pay more.73 "[T]his ... rule might be justified as 'a
presumptive case of "good faith" under the Code."'74
Effross proposes that "a lawyer can define 'good faith' in this
context by a function GF that operates over the range (o% to ioo%) of
possible repayments to undersecured general creditors."75 Similar to the
tallness function, "the function GF would generally rise from o for o%
repayment to i at the local target percentage of such Chapter 13
repayments and then remain i for any percentage above that." 6 Thus,
fuzzy logic is used to approximate what constitutes a good faith
repayment of unsecured debt in a Chapter 13 plan.
Other scholars have implemented fuzzy logic in analyzing legal
situations in which uncertain definitions of terms or vague concepts
create possible conflict. Fuzzy logic has been applied to many legal
concepts: secured debt,77 fraudulent transfers," fairness in fiduciary-duty
corporate litigation,79  the debate between natural law and legal
positivism,8° and logical inference in evidence.8' Kosko has even posited
judicial decision making as a fuzzy system. 8' Regardless of the context in
which fuzzy logic has been applied, legal scholars have praised fuzzy logic
for its ability to express complex and uncertain topics in everyday
language that reasonable people can understand."
71. Effross, supra note 28, at 153.
72. Id. (citing Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501,532 (993)).




77. Adams et al., supra note 28, at 2243-47.
78. Williams, supra note 29.
79. Yablon, supra note 28.
8o. Adams & Spaak, supra note 28.
8i. Schum, supra note 28, at 867-69 (noting the use of fuzzy quantifiers in legal argument, such as
"[pleople who purchase guns subsequently used in a robbery: (I) almost always are the robber," and
giving examples of fuzzy inference).
82. KosKo, supra note 24, at 178-8o (stating that "law principles look a lot like fuzzy rules").
83. This is a very brief introduction to fuzzy logic. Another important concept is that of "hedges."
These are modifiers to a fuzzy set. For example, if we have the fuzzy set T of tall people, then some
modifiers, or hedges, could include the words very, moderately, slightly, and not very. The hedges
would be used to modify the membership value. For a better explanation of hedges, see McNEILL &
FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 66-68.
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II. A SPECIAL PROBLEM IN PATENT LAW
Next, one must understand the basic requirements of patentability,
patent applications, and patent infringement to fully comprehend the
intriguing problem (and confusion) in applying the doctrine of
equivalents to means-plus-function claims. A patentee, a person or entity
holding a patent, will typically argue literal infringement, or in the
alternative, non-literal infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
when suing an alleged infringer.
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW
The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact patent
legislation."' Each patent has a specification. Congress requires that a
patent specification
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
•.. set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
The claims in the patent specification set forth the scope of legal
protection afforded to the inventor.8  The specification draws the bounds
of intellectual property that the patent protects. 7
A device literally infringes a patent claim when that device contains
every limitation of the patent claim.88 Infringement analysis requires two
steps: first, the court interprets the claims as a matter of law to determine
their meaning and scope; second, the trier of fact determines whether the
properly construed claims describe the accused product."' If the device
does not literally infringe, it may infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents.'
The doctrine of equivalents is a controversial judicially created
doctrine used to prevent "the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries ... .
85. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
86. Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(noting that claims "define or delimit the scope of the legal protection which the government grant
gives the patent owner, the patent 'monopoly').
87. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 51o (917) ("The
scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims contained in it, read in light of
the specification.").
88. Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("To establish
literal infringement, every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in an accused product,
exactly.").
89. Id.
9o. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 6 5, 6o7-o8 (195o).
May 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though
adding nothing, would be enough to take the matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of the law." 9' When asked recently to put the
doctrine of equivalents to death, the Supreme Court declined the
invitation. 92 In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court described the doctrine
of equivalents in esoteric language: "Equivalence, in the patent law, is
not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a
vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in
every respect."93  The Court further explained: "In determining
equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each
other and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may
sometimes be equivalents."94 However, an important factor in Graver
Tank was "whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the
patent with one that was."95 About fifty years later, the Supreme Court
provided a "way-function-result" test to determine doctrine of
equivalents infringement: if the accused product (i) performs
substantially the same function; (2) in substantially the same way; (3) to
achieve substantial!) the same result as the claimed element of the
patented invention. The Court noted that the alternative "insubstantial
differences" test might also be utilized.97 The doctrine of equivalents can
be used against any accused technology regardless of when the
technology arose.9 The Court has continued to uphold the doctrine of
equivalents, because "[i]f patents were always interpreted by their literal
terms, their value would be greatly diminished."'
Another kind of equivalence is found in means-plus-function claims.
Congress allows that:
[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
91. ld. at 6o7.
92. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (i997) ("Petitioner, which
was found to have infringed upon respondent's patent under the doctrine of equivalents, invites us to
speak the death of that doctrine. We decline that invitation.").
93. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 6o9.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39-40.
97. Id. at 40.
98. Id. at 37.
99. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). The Federal
Circuit has noted that "the requirement that equivalence be evaluated from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art applies whether equivalence is measured by the 'function-way-result' test or by
the 'insubstantial differences' test." Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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described in the specification and equivalents thereof.'"
At the discretion of the claims drafter, the patentee can describe the
function of a certain element without specifically laying out the exact
structure of the element in the claims.' '
The test for literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim bears
substantial resemblance to the tri-partite test for doctrine of equivalents
infringement. Literal infringement of a means-plus-function limitation
requires that the relevant structure in the accused device perform the
identical function recited in the claim and be identical or equivalent to
the corresponding structure in the specification."' Thus, literal
infringement of a means-plus-function claim incorporates the doctrine of
equivalents to the extent that the accused device must perform the
identical function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially
the same result as the specified claim.
B. A ROLLER SKATE PATENT EXAMPLE
A roller skate patent provides a good example of the above ideas."
"Suppose the patent is for a roller skate and the claim reads: 'An
apparatus comprising: a shoe; four wheels; and a rubber stopper.""' 4
Literal infringement of this patent would require a device to include each
of the three elements recited in the claim.' 5 Three wheels would not
literally infringe. However, under the doctrine of equivalents, three
wheels might infringe if the three wheels perform substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same
result. Three wheels are being used for the same function as the four
wheels-"to support the shoe and allow the skate to roll."' 6 The same
result is also reached because the three wheels allow the user to skate.
Thus, if the trier of fact determines that the three-wheeled skate
performs the function in substantially the same way as the four-wheeled
skate, then the accused device infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents." The "way" inquiry focuses on the structure used in the
device-the wheels. °8
Suppose further that the drafter opted to write the claim as: "An
100. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
lol. AI-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 13o8, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
102. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. '999).
103. This example is borrowed from a recent law review article. See Beyer, supra note 2o, at 502-
07.
104. Id. at 502.
105. Id.; see also Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("To
establish literal infringement, every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in an accused product,
exactly.").





apparatus comprising: a shoe, four wheels, and a means for stopping."
Here, the claim drafter did not specify the exact structure that allows the
skate to stop because a means-plus-function claim was invoked.'"
However, the patent specification would need to set forth a structure for
the "means for stopping." If the only structure presented were a rubber
stopper on the toe of the shoe that the user drags on the ground to stop,
then the accused device must perform that identical function, "stopping,"
in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result."
Literal infringement under this means-plus-function claim cannot include
technology that arose after the filing of the patent because a person with
reasonable skill in the art drafting the claim cannot predict technology
that has not been invented yet."' Thus, if the alleged device comprises of
a remote-controlled, wheel-locking device, then the newer device cannot
literally infringe because the technology arose after the roller skate was
invented, but the device might infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents."2
C. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS TO MEANS-PLUs-FUNCTION
CLAIMS
The Federal Circuit proclaimed that there is "no policy-based reason
why a patentee should get two bites at the apple" when discussing the
difference between equivalence under the doctrine and by statute."3 The
only relevant difference between the two analyses, besides the statutory
means equivalence test requiring an identical function, is whether the
accused device incorporates "after-developed technology" that arose
after the patent issued."4 If the alleged infringer utilized "after-developed
technology," then doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis becomes
necessary because "one cannot predict the future."'"5 The temporal
requirement allows the jury to find that a structural limitation is not
statutorily equivalent under literal infringement of the means-plus-
function claim, and yet, is equivalent to the claim limitation under the
equitable doctrine of equivalents.
1 6
Returning to the roller skate patent example, assume the same
to9. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., i85 F.3 d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. i999).
iio. Beyer, supra note 2o, at 5o4.
i I i. AI-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3 d 13o8, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
112. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
113. Id. at 131.
114. Id. at 1310.
I15. Id.
II6. It is no surprise that juries are confused. Even judges get confused. See Judicial Panel
Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1145 (1993) ("Honest to God, I don't see
how you could try a patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of these things.
It's like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It's factually so complicated."
(quoting Judge Alfred V. Covello, U.S. District Judge, Dist. of Conn.)).
[VOL. 59:1257
THE MYTH OF "LUCKY" PATENT VERDICTS
patent claim:
"An apparatus comprising: a shoe; four wheels; and a means for
stopping." The patent specification discloses the structure for the"means for stopping" as a rubber toe stopper that the user drags on the
ground. A competitor makes a roller skate that uses a rubber brake
pad that applies pressure to one of the wheels when the user presses a
button on a handheld remote control device."7
If the finder of fact determined that the rubber brake pad did not
literally infringe the patent, the patentee would attempt to assert
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Under Chiuminatta, the
patentee has access to this doctrine only if: "(i) the technology used in
the rubber brake pads did not exist when the roller skate patent was
filed[;] or (2) the competitor's roller skate did not literally infringe
because the rubber brake pad did not perform the identical function of
'stopping.""'I8
Analyzing the law of the doctrine of equivalents as applied to
means-plus-function claim limitations is not for the faint of heart. In
order for the average juror to deliver a well-informed verdict,
commentators have suggested the use of more explicit jury devices, such
as special verdicts and fact-intensive jury instructions."9 Jurors, untrained
in the law, should not have to struggle in understanding the law as well as
the complicated facts during jury deliberations.
III. JURIES IN PATENT TRIALS
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trials even in
civil cases.'20 However, conducting a modern jury trial, which inevitably
involves complex subject matter, has many challenges. One litigator
writes: "The complex civil case presents a severe challenge to the jury
system, taxing the capacities of the lay jury to the utmost, and
consequently taxing the abilities of the litigators and judges who must
deal with the jury's limitations .... ' Jurors must apply their common sense
and everyday experience in assessing the credibility of witnesses and
deciding among competing versions of facts and apply the law to those
facts in accordance with the instructions of the court.'22 However, the
litigation partner writes: "Nothing in their experience prepares them for
this job.... [T]he jury is the only decision making body in the world
117. Beyer, supra note 20, at 506.
118. Id. Option (2) leaves open the possibility of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
because literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim requires an identical function. Id. at n.38.
159. Id. at 522-23; Caliendo, supra note 20, at 225-33.
120. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII.
121. Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 335, 335 (1999).
122. Id. at 336-37.
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selected specifically for its lack of expertise in the subject matter.' 23
The need for techniques to aid the jury cannot be overstated:
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has written:
Too often, jurors are allowed to do nothing but listen passively to
the testimony, without any idea what the legal issues are in the
case, without permission to take notes or participate in any way,
finally to be read a virtually incomprehensible set of instructions
and sent into the jury room to reach a verdict in a case they may
not understand much better than they did before the trial began."4
This concern over the jury's competence has spawned many studies in
jury decision making'25 as well as experiments on jury techniques."6
Patent trials are complex. Historically, juries have participated in
aspects of patent disputes since the enactment of the first patent statute
in 1790, providing that "such damages as shall be assessed by a jury.
''I1 7
But in the last twenty years, the Yercentage of patent disputes resulting
in a jury trial has skyrocketed. 2" One scholar suggests that the reason
behind the increase in jury demands stems from the argument that "if
juries are unable to understand the technology or apply the law, their
decisions will be based on less meritorious influences such as bias,
likeability, or emotion.'2.9 To combat the "less meritorious influences,"
special jury techniques must be employed.
A. IMPROVING JUROR COMPETENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Commentators have suggested a number of techniques to assist
123. Id. at 337 (emphasis omitted).
124. Id. at 338 (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Juries: They May Be Broke, but We Can Fix Them,
FED. LAW., June 1997, at 20, 22).
125. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 753-55 & n.i8 (1999) ("[O]nly a few studies have
directly compared the performance of jurors to judges.... All of these studies found no differences in
decisionmaking between judges and jurors.").
126. See generally Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 749 (99); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions
During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIz. L. REV. I (2003); Bethany K. Dumas,
Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701
(2000); Valerie P. Hans, Inside the Black Box: Comment on Diamond and Vidmar, 87 VA. L. REV. 1917
(2OO1); Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The
Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (i99); Nicole L. Mott,
The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1099 (2003); Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury
Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 259 (I997); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the
Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (1993).
127. Moore, supra note 6, at 366 (citing Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch.7, § 4, 1 Stat. 1o9, I 1).
128. Id. ("In 1940, 2.5% of all patent cases tried in district court were heard by juries. From 1968 to
1970, the figure was almost unchanged at 2.8%. By contrast, from 1997 to 1999, 59% of all patent trials
were tried to juries.").
129. Moore, supra note 7. Moore notes that "the less a jury understands about the technology, the
more likely unrelated issues will influence decisionmaking." Id. at 852 n.15.
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juries in making rational decisions in complex cases, including rigorous
application of the rules of evidence, frequent jury instructions, judicial
comment on the evidence, paperless trials, juror note taking, juror
questions, instructions in the jury room, and special verdicts.'30 The
emphasis has been on making jury instructions more accessible through
the use of simple, everyday language,'3 ' allowing jurors to ask questions
during trial,'32 the psychological effects of juror note taking,'33 and
allowing jurors to deliberate during the course of the proceedings.'34
While these techniques provide valuable aids to juror
comprehension, I suggest that the use of special verdicts specially
prepared for patent litigation would greatly decrease the number of
inconsistent verdicts. In particular, applying fuzzy logic to special verdicts
would allow the jury to fully express any uncertainty in their decision
while providing the reviewing court with tangible evidence of the
reasoning method the jury employed in making its decision.
B. DEFINING THE JUROR'S ROLE IN PATENT CASES THROUGH SPECIAL
VERDICTS
Lawyers love to complain about the incompetence of the lay juror.'35
However, studies have shown that juries and judges are affirmed by the
Federal Circuit with equal frequency., 6 Jurors bring common sense to
civil trials.'37 Yet, "if the jury has an Achilles heel, it is the comprehension
of legal instructions."'' 3 Scholars have suggested that extensively specific
special verdict forms would help to avoid this problem of
comprehension,'39 because jurors have no special ability to apply the law
130. See Cecil et al., supra note 126, at 744-74 (presenting research on juror competence and
suggesting aids to increase comprehension); Longhofer, supra note 121, at 338-47 (presenting several
techniques to assist juries in complex litigation).
131. See Dumas, supra note 126, at 721-42 (discussing at length techniques to improve the
comprehensibility of jury instructions); Tiersma, supra note 126, at 41-78 (presenting empirical data
showing that jurors do not comprehend pattern jury instructions and suggesting further reform).
132. See Mott, supra note 126, at 1099-1121 (analyzing the benefits and concerns of juror questions
and the substantive content of the actual questions); Penrod & Heuer, supra note 126, at 262, 271-8o
(noting that "decisions about juror questioning of witnesses date back to as early as 1825").
133. See Penrod & Heuer, supra note 126, at 263-71.
134. See Diamond et al., supra note 126, at 3-78 (studying the experimental use of allowing jury
deliberations during the course of the trial in Arizona); Hans, supra note 126, at 1917-32 (commenting
on Diamond and Vidmar's Arizona Jury Project); Hans et al., supra note 126, at 349-66 (discussing the
theoretical, legal, and policy issues raised in permitting juror discussions during trial and describing the
results of a field experiment to survey the jurors about the issues raised).
135. Moore, Lack of Transparency, supra note 23, at 779.
136. Id. at 781.
137. See Penrod & Heuer, supra note 126, at 261 (noting that "common sense is one of the
strengths and one of the weaknesses that juries bring to their decision making").
138. Cecil et al., supra note 126.
139. See Beyer, supra note 20, at 521-24 (noting that special verdicts are particularly useful in
patent infringement actions); Caliendo, supra note 2o, at 227-33 (proposing specific jury instructions
to reduce the amount of inconsistent jury verdicts); Moore, Lack of Transparency, supra note 23, at
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to the facts. If the main purpose of utilizing a jury is to utilize their
common sense in fact finding, courts should use special verdict forms that
reduce complex legal decision making to simpler specific questions of
fact.
Edward S. Adams and Daniel A. Farber summarized numerous
cognitive psychology expert-reasoning studies and made three major
conclusions about how experts make decisions:
First, expertise does not simply consist of knowing a greater number of
facts or rules. It also involves the crucial ability to pick out the key
features of a new situation. Second, this skill is learned primarily
through experience with large numbers of past situations. Third,
expertise is not merely an act of intuitive perception. [Experts] do not
merely perceive [the subject matter] more accurately than novices;
they give better reasons for their interpretations and are better able to
test those interpretations against additional information.40
Assuming that these findings carry over into the law, the authors
hypothesize that judicial decision making has similar characteristics: (i)
regardless of a judge's favored methodology, pattern analysis will be
used in that methodology; (2) the pattern analysis will identify and
categorize the salient facts and link those facts with relevant legal
interpretations; and (3) the judge's ability to conduct this pattern analysis
greatly depends on experience and training as much as it depends on raw
ability or knowledge of legal theories.'4 '
Clearly, lay jurors are not experts in the law, nor experts in patents.
Yet, each juror will bring some level of expertise in truth telling and
common sense. Although imperfect, juries provide a sample of how the
community would judge the case.'42 This sampling function is a core
benefit of the jury system. Scholars have also suggested that juries and
judges have roughly equivalent reliability in decision making.'43
Of course, this Note does not suggest that jurors approach legal
issues in the same manner as judges and lawyers; it does argue, however,
that a juror, in reasoning through a patent case, relies on past problem-
solving experience to arrive at some conclusions during deliberations.
Because the jury, as a whole, relies on its past experience in reasoning
through problems, the same characteristics of judicial decision making
outlined above become relevant when deciding whether a polling device
783-8oi.
140. Adams & Farber, supra note 28, at 1288-89.
141. Id. at 1289.
142. See Wissler et al., supra note 125, at 815 ("Without juries, the ability to estimate the
community's sense of the value of the [damages] is forfeited. That juries consist of groups, drawn more
or less at random from the community, is essential to the sampling function. Imperfect sampling
though it may be, it is less imperfect than having no sampling at all.").
143. Id. ("[T]here is good reason to believe that juries (groups) produce considerably more stable
and predictable outcomes compared to jurors (individuals).").
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would alter or tamper with the results of a jury verdict.
If a jury device were used to poll individual jurors on their views of
the case regarding patent infringement, then the average of the
individual responses would return the "center of gravity" of the jury.'"
Scholars have generally accepted the "stabilizing power of aggregation
into groups."'45 "People in decisionmaking groups tend to coalesce
toward a consensus; their shifts tend to be toward, rather than away
from, each other.' ' I 6 Thus, it would not be outrageous to suggest that the
individual jurors' opinions be averaged when the properties of groups
indicate that such an effect already occurs in practice.
IV. USING Fuzzy LOGIC IN A SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
The transition to using fuzzy logic in a special verdict form should be
relatively easy. As mentioned above, people are accustomed to fuzzy
ideas already. Most federal district courts use special verdict forms in
patent jury trials, although their use is not mandated by the Federal
Circuit.'47 As a result, the special verdict forms in use vary in degrees of
specificity.' One scholar has argued that the Federal Circuit can and
should force district courts to use these forms by reversing any verdict
that does not employ them as an abuse of discretion.'" In contrast, I
believe that fuzzy verdict forms can be used on a volunteer basis.
Through the comparison of the results of these "test runs" in different
jurisdictions across the country, I believe that practitioners would employ
fuzzy verdicts with greater frequency.
A. CURRENT SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS IN USE
The special verdict forms in use vary greatly in detailing exactly how
the jury reasoned its verdict. This range varies "between sparse and
completely thoughtless declarations of which party the jury preferred" to
a "few detailed, meaningful verdicts."'' 0
However, most suggested special verdicts also fail to account for the
144. See infra notes 6o-61 and accompanying text.
145. Wissler et al., supra note 125, at 8ol-O2 (noting the expectation that "group decisions
decrease in variability (and increase in predictability) compared to the decisions of the individuals who
compose the groups" because of the "basic statistical and social psychological properties of groups").
146. Id. at 802 n.145 (citing A. PAUL HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 19 (1976); see
also MUZAFIR SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 104 (1936)).
147. Moore, Lack of Transparency, supra note 23, at 794 ("Although the Federal Circuit has not
required special verdicts even in limited circumstances, such as cases involving the issue of
obviousness, validity, or the doctrine of equivalents, some regional circuits have required special
verdicts on underlying factual issues in patent cases.").
148. Id. at 784-90.
149. Id. at 797 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit could "persuade district courts to utilize
detailed special verdict forms when deciding doctrine of equivalents issues by holding that it is an
abuse of discretion each time the court fails to do so").
150. Id. at 784-85.
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complicated area of means-plus-function claims. The following is a
typical set of special verdicts in a patent infringement action:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence:
i. That the Defendant's product literally infringes a claim
contained in the patent?
Answer Yes or No
2. That the Defendant's product infringes, under the "doctrine of
equivalents," a claim contained in the patent?
Answer Yes or No
[Note: If you answered No to both of the preceding questions, you
need not answer the remaining questions.]
3. That the Plaintiff's patent is invalid because [state the basis of
the Defendant's claim of invalidity]?
Answer Yes or No
4. If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, that the Plaintiff
should be awarded $ __ in damages.
SO SAY WE ALL '
A set of special verdicts like the one above do little to enhance a
reviewing court's understanding of what issues the jury considered close,
how hotly contested the case was, etc. More details and specifics are
needed to paint a better picture of what the jury dealt with during
deliberations. However, many jurisdictions that offer jury instructions for
patent cases do not cover doctrine of equivalents infringement for
means-plus-function claims because of the complicated and fact-specific
subject matter.'52
If there were a standard special verdict form for applying the
doctrine of equivalents to means-plus-function claims, the result would
already employ fuzzy concepts. One commentator has offered the
following special verdict form to yield consistent jury verdicts in applying
the doctrine of equivalents to means-plus-function claims:
i. Does the (portion of the accused device relevant to the claim at
issue) contain technology that did not exist at the time the patent
151. Beyer, supra note 20, at 521-22 (quoting 3A KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS ch. 158.oi (5th ed. 2001)).
152. See O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note I5i, at ch. 158.23; Model Patent Jury Instructions for the
Northern District of California, Instruction 3.6, at 17, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov (follow "For
Attorneys" hyperlink; then follow "Model Patent Jury Instructions" hyperlink; then open the "pdf"
file icon) (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) ("No model instruction is provided since an instruction on this
subject is necessarily case specific. However, a means-plus-function requirement can be met under the
doctrine of equivalents if the function is not the same but is equivalent ... or the corresponding
structure in the accused product is later developed technology." (citing Chiuminatta Concrete
Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. i998); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l,
Inc., 174 F.3 d 13o8, 1320 (Fed. Cir. i999); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3 d 1339, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 1999))).
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application was filed?
[Answer Yes or No]
2. Does the (structure utilized in the accused device) perform the
identical function as the (function claimed in the means-plus-function
claim)?
[Answer Yes or No]
3. Does the (structure utilized in the accused device) perform an
equivalent function to the (function claimed in the means-plus-function
claim)?
[Answer Yes or No]
4. Is the (structure utilized in the accused device) the same or
equivalent to the (structure disclosed in the patent specification)?
[Answer Yes or No]'53
The problem of bivalence persists prominently in this set of special
verdicts. Although these questions clearly delineate the elements of
doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis as applied to means-plus-
function claims, the questions still fail to take into account the level of
uncertainty that might be present in the jurors' minds. In fact, crisp
answers of "Yes" and "No" round off any uncertainty that might have
been present, thus presenting a false pretense of absolute certainty.
However, fuzziness covers vagueness, a type of uncertainty,'54 and so its
implementation can potentially lead to more expressive, meaningful jury
verdicts.
B. A SET OF Fuzzy SPECIAL VERDICTS
Because fuzziness is ubiquitous and is used in everyday language, it
is actually quite easy to throw fuzziness into a set of special verdicts. The
aim of this Note is not to mandate the use of fuzzy concepts in every
patent trial, but only to offer an alternative to the current paradigm. I
used the second set of special verdicts described in Part IV.A above and
the tri-partite test offered in Warner-Jenkinson as guidance in
formulating a general set of questions on a sample fuzzy special verdict
form.'55 Before the jury deliberations start, each juror would receive a set
153. Beyer, supra note 2o, at 523.
154. MCNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 187 ("There are at least four basic types [of
uncertainty]: nonspecificity, fuzziness, dissonance, and confusion."). McNeill and Freiberger devote an
entire chapter, entitled "Turf War," to describe the ongoing debate between probabilists and fuzzy
supporters. Id. at 174-91. "Bayesian probability can be very useful, but it is not a panacea." Id. at 186.
"[Plrobability models only one kind of uncertainty-degree of conflict-because it was designed that
way." Id. at 188. "By making vague expectations precise, [a fuzzy theorist] says, Bayesians fail to know
their ignorance, and by disdaining to model vagueness appropriately, they ignore available
knowledge." Id. at 189.
155. The test for doctrine of equivalence, as stated by the Federal Circuit, "depends on 'whether
the substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the
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of fact-specific questions and a scantron to mark their individual
responses:
In regards to [a particular claim limitation], answer the following
questions using the following key:
(A = Not at all; B = To a small degree; C = About the same; D =
Substantially the Same; E = Identical)
i. To what extent do [the accused device] and [the patented device]
perform the same function?
2. To what extent do [the accused device] and [the patented device]
perform in the same way?
3. To what extent do [the accused device] and [the patented device]
achieve the same result?
Of course, the lawyer submitting the questions would need to repeat
the three questions for each claim limitation (structural or functional)
that is contested. Safeguards to prevent human error should be
implemented, including special fonts for the questions or grouping the
questions by each contested claim element. The jurors' answers would
then be scanned and tallied and identified by randomized juror number.
This would provide to a reviewing court, at the claim element level, a
written record of the initial thoughts of each juror. The proverbial "black
box verdict" of the jury would start to become transparent.
Comparing the two sets of special verdict forms, the differences
between the crisp and fuzzy questions are clear. The main benefit of the
fuzzy set of questions is that the juror is allowed to express uncertainty
anonymously. Responses "B" or "C" represent smaller gradients of
similarity that will express the juror's uncertainty. Currently, we only ask
the jury to choose between responses "A," "D," or "E." Moreover, the
juror responding to these sets of questions is not biased by other jurors at
this stage of the deliberations process. However, the individual fuzzy
responses must be transformed into a crisp verdict-this is done by
"defuzzying" the fuzzy verdict.
C. PROCEDURE TO "DEFUZZIFY" THE Fuzzy VERDICT
After the responses are tallied, the results would be presented to the
jurors in the form of a chart and bar graph. A computer program would
transform the lettered responses A-E to the numbers 1-5. Then, the jury
would be informed of the initial impressions of the jurors in an objective
format. After jury deliberations, or at the request of the jury, the process
could be repeated and the results tabulated again.
substitute element plays a role substantially different from the claimed element."' Tronzo v. Biomet,
Inc., 156 F.3 d 1154, 1i6o (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997)).
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The computer program would return the mean and mode of each
question. If all the contested elements return a mean response of 5, then
the patent is literally infringed. If the mean response for all three
questions of a particular claim limitation is greater than 4 (substantially
the same), then that claim element has been infringed either through
doctrine of equivalents (when the mean response is 4) or literally (when
the mean response is 5).
In instances where the mean is less than 4, the results would be
interpreted by a set of fuzzy rules that look at both the mean and mode
of the responses. The mean, as stated earlier, shows the "center of
gravity" of the jury's initial impressions of the case. The mode would
show which of the responses garnered the most votes of the jury. Both
the mean and mode would be used as the starting point of jury
deliberations.
At this point, the procedure can be modified by the jurors. If the jury
is satisfied with the result-a finding of noninfringement (average score
of less than 4), equivalence infringement (average score between 4 and
5), or literal infringement (average score of 5)-then deliberations could
end there. For example, suppose the infringement issue is crystal clear-
the accused device literally infringed the patent. The special verdict
would still serve the purpose of illuminating each individual juror's
perceptions of the appropriate issue and the verdict would be meaningful
if, on the first administration of the fuzzy verdict form, all jurors found
literal infringement. This is a rare and unlikely occurrence, however,
because most patent cases proceeding to trial involve hotly contested
technical issues. 5
6
Suppose that the initial responses averaged to an extremely vague
and fuzzy result. Some jurors might find an "identical" function and
others might only find a "similar" function instead of a "substantially
similar" function. Let us further assume that the split is dead even with
six jurors finding an "identical" function and six jurors finding a "similar"
function. The average would be a "substantially similar" function, but
half the jurors might not be satisfied with that result. Thus, the
deliberations would continue. The process has still benefited the overall
jury deliberations process because the questions have isolated which
issues, in this case the function test, are potentially confusing or
nebulous. By isolating the issues that the jurors are divided on, the jurors
can quickly and efficiently deliberate on those specific issues. Further,
the initial impression test memorializes the juror's thoughts without the
156. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 14, at 242-43 (recognizing the shortcoming of the patent
litigation system for revoking invalid patents and that due to extremely high costs of litigation running
from $5oo,ooo to $3 million per suit or $5oo,ooo per claim, "[o]nly patent disputes where it is difficult
to predict who will win are likely to proceed further to a final determination on the merits").
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potential bias and influence of a juror who paid more attention to the
trial than others,'57 or favored one party over the other,': or held
prejudice toward foreign corporations.'59 Upon request, the jury can
repeat this proposed process of answering the special verdict forms and
tallying the results as many times as is necessary.
D. IMPACT ON APPELLATE REVIEWABILITY
The effects of recording the jurors' initial impressions of the case
and the final verdict on an individual juror basis are unclear because such
an approach, to my knowledge and research, has never been applied.
Several issues arise in contemplating the introduction of such a schema:
the utility of this information to the reviewing court, the benefit of
understanding how the jury deliberated, and what courts should do with
this new knowledge.
First, by having some written recording detailing how a jury arrived
at its verdict, the reviewing court can decide whether that jury was
reasonable in coming to that conclusion. As it stands, appellate courts
merely trust that the jury acted reasonably.'16
Second, information on how deliberations affected initial
impressions would add weight to the credibility and accuracy of the jury's
verdict. Suppose the eight or twelve person jury initially leaned toward
verdict A but finally decided on verdict B. Having evidence of the
"changing of the minds" on an individual juror level would give a
reviewing court some confidence that the verdict was thoroughly
discussed, perhaps hotly debated, and well reasoned. Overturning such a
verdict would become nearly impossible because the reviewing court
applies a deferential standard in reviewing a jury's factual findings in
support of its conclusion.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit would not lose its power to reverse jury
verdicts; however, better documentation of juror reasoning and the
effects of deliberation on an individual juror's certainty would benefit
reviewing courts, because the new information would identify problems
in jurors' understanding of specific jury instructions for future reform as
157. See Penrod & Heuer, supra note 126, at 267-68.
158. Id. at 269-7o.
159. See Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1504
(noting that the author's data "validates concerns that American courts, and American juries in
particular, exhibit xenophobic bias").
26o. See Moore, supra note 6, at 368 ("Deferential standards of review leave the Federal Circuit
with little ability to disturb potentially flawed jury decisions. Moreover, the system lacks sufficient
transparency to ascertain flaws in jury verdicts.").
161. "The jury's factual findings in support of its conclusion are entitled to a deferential standard
of review. Our task is to determine whether substantial evidence supports these findings and
conclusion." Beachcombers, Int'l v. Wildewood Creative Prods., 3 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).
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well as provide some insight into the notorious black box of a jury
verdict.
V. CRITICISMS OF A Fuzzy SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
New ideas take time to digest."62 The use of fuzzy concepts in the law
is miniscule in comparison to the other applications of fuzzy logic,
especially in Japan.'6 3 Briefly, I will address some perceived limitations
and problems of using this method, including the certainty of verdicts,
increased complexity, increased time and cost, and the potential
confusion between probability and fuzziness.
The certainty of verdicts will not be diminished under the new
scheme. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) allows the use of special
verdicts.' 6' Although the fuzzy special verdict is atypical, it operates
within the existing law of the doctrine of equivalents as applied to means-
plus-function claim limitations, because the language of the judge-made
doctrine lends itself to fuzziness, or vagueness. If anything, the fuzzy
verdict forms will provide a reliable indicator to a reviewing court that
indicates the juror's initial impressions of the case and serves as an
additional tool for further studies in developing techniques to assist juries
in complex litigation. Further, the verdict's certainty is not diminished
because the end result is the same-either the accused device infringes or
it does not.
Jurors encounter complex fuzzy ideas every day. Similarly, they are
polled on a wide range of topics using questionnaires similar to the fuzzy
162. Even though fuzzy logic was invented in 1965 by Lotfi Zadeh, a professor at the University of
California, Berkeley, American companies failed to take advantage of the discovery until Zadeh
received the Honda Prize in 1989, which placed him in the company of Carl Sagan, Ilya Prigogine, and
other well-known scholars. McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 172. When he accepted the
award, most engineers in the United States had never heard of fuzzy logic. Id. at 173 ("Somewhere,
somebody was missing something.").
163. In Japan, Hitachi engineers used fuzzy logic to control a whole subway system in Sendai. The
automated subway system "has the smoothest ride on earth," can stop within seven centimeters of a
target, and saves energy, cutting costs "a whopping Io percent." McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24,
at 156. "Moreover, says Zadeh, 'They've never had a mishap."' Id.
164. The rule states:
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written
finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written
questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of
the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and
evidence: or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written
findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such
explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to
enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue
of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by
jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if
it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on
the special verdict.
FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a).
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special verdicts.6 ' The beauty of fuzzy logic is its ubiquitous nature. The
only "complexity" added in the proposed process is the act of filling out a
scantron, forcing individual jurors to form an opinion instead of going
along with the outspoken majority. In truth, most people are used to
filling out questionnaires, and so this should not pose a comprehension
issue.
Time and cost are precious commodities, so critics might argue that
these experimental fuzzy verdicts will take jurors, judges, and lawyers too
much time to learn and thus, would become cost prohibitive. I argue that
time spent understanding this proposed process is time well spent
because the underlying legal issues, doctrine of equivalents and means-
plus-function claims, are inherently fuzzy concepts. In fact, most legal
ideas, including reasonableness, are fuzzy. In any case, the jury would
spend time struggling to understand the underlying legal concepts which,
for this example, include the fuzzy concept of equivalence. Therefore,
time is not an issue for the jury because the proposed method of
obtaining the jury's impression of whether infringement has occurred
would not add significant time to the deliberative process.
The time and cost to lawyers and judges in preparing these verdict
forms might be significant depending on the complexity of the patent
dispute. I also argue that this time is also well spent because, in preparing
the special verdict forms, the parties and the judge are forced to pinpoint
the contested facts. Any device that can help elucidate the issues
presented to the court would be worth the time and money.
Probabilistic analysis runs rampant in legal studies. As mentioned in
the introduction, scholars have claimed that patent rights are
probabilistic by analyzing the rates at which patents are held as invalid.
This is a direct result of the adversarial nature of our legal system.
Probability is designed to cover uncertainty where there is dissonance.'
66
Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger write, "Dissonance is pure conflict.
One statement is true and its rivals are false.... Some evidence supports
one thesis, different evidence the other, and we are uncertain between
the two."' '6 Based on this, probabilists would dismiss fuzzy logic as
inapposite because our legal system demands a "true" result, not a
"fuzzy" result.
This argument misses the point of the fuzzy special verdict. I do not
argue for fuzzy results. The "defuzzification" procedure outlined in Part
165. Everyone has answered a questionnaire that asks the respondent to answer "Strongly Agree,
Agree, Uncertain, Disagree, or Strongly Disagree" to some statement because of the reliability of the
Likert scale. Cf. Likert Scaling, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/scallik.php (last visited Apr.
20, 2008). However, Likert scale administrators do not average responses, but only return median
responses. Fuzziness, however, measures the extent of uncertainty, so averaging is appropriate.
166. See McNEILL & FREIBERGER, supra note 24, at 187.
167. Id.
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IV above produces a "true" result-the impressions of the jurors
represented in raw data. Casting the idea of patent infringement into a
spectrum ranging from noninfringement to literal infringement always
results in a "true" result because juries' are constitutionally entrusted
with this truth-finding task. Fuzziness does not, therefore, make the
verdict false.
Fuzzy logic has produced amazing results in many instances,
including the realm of legal scholarship. The use of fuzzy logic, also
known as a "sliding scale theorem,"'6 has helped legal scholars
understand and express the intricacies of fraudulent transfer rules in the
Bankruptcy Code,' 69 teach fuzzy lawyering skills,'7" and even modal
constitutional questions."' Why shouldn't patent litigators benefit from
this concept as well?
CONCLUSION
It is my hope that this Note starts a dialogue between practitioners
and fuzzy legal scholars'72 who study jury techniques and the consistency
of patent jury verdicts. As discussed in this Note, the patent law concept
of equivalence employs multiple fuzzy concepts, including the
substantially similar way-function-result test'73 of the doctrine of
equivalents.'74 Because jurors are lay persons unfamiliar with legal terms
of art and because the jury system relies on jurors' common sense,
fuzziness can be used to maintain the purpose of juries-settling the
disputed facts-while also giving jurors the freedom to express their
uncertainty or recognize the vagueness of complicated subject matter.
The benefits of implementing fuzzy logic in patent jury verdicts are
numerous. The quality of appellate review of patent jury verdicts would
skyrocket as a result of implementing fuzzy logic in special verdicts
because reviewing courts would have tangible evidence in the form of
168. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 ALA. L. REV.
421 (2002).
169. See generally Adams & Farber, supra note 28; Effross, supra note 28; Williams, supra note 29.
170. See generally David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Paradigm for Crisper
Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 163 (997).
171. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 685 (1996).
172. For two recent excellent treatises on fuzzy logic, see JoAo M.C. SousA & UZAY KAYMAK,
Fuzzy DECISION MAKING IN MODELING AND CONTROL (2002), and K.zuo TANAKA, AN INTRODUCTION
TO Fuzzy LOGIC FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (Tak Niimura trans., 1997).
173. The way-function-result test, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson, is a
particular linguistic framework to determine whether an accused product infringes by the doctrine of
equivalents. Under this framework, we look at whether the accused product performs substantially the
same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed
element of the patented invention. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
39-40 (1997).
174. See supra Part IV.B.
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scantrons and verdict forms from individual jurors throughout the jury
deliberation process.'75 Additionally, jurors, for the first time, would be
able to express their uncertainty in complicated cases., 6 Utilizing
uncertainty as a measurement tool, instead of treating it as
incompetence, would help to guide the jurors' discussions to the
particularly confusing or disputed claims during jury deliberations.
Lastly, the anonymity of the procedure outlined in polling individual
jurors before deliberations provides an outlet for jurors to be honest
about their particular understanding of the case without the potential
bias of a single juror who may have been paying closer attention to the
case than others.'
77
More than four decades after Zadeh's historic paper, ' patent law, of
all legal specialties, should start receiving the benefits of embracing
uncertainty and fuzzy logic to dispel the myth of "lucky" jury verdicts.
With the implementation of these fuzzy special verdict forms, it is my
hope that practitioners and judges will help juries execute their
constitutional duty to make hard decisions in complex trials. The use of
fuzzy special verdicts could also spread to other contexts where legal
standards are inherently fuzzy. Fuzzy special verdicts can be used in any
context where fuzziness, or vagueness, pervades the underlying legal
issue. Many legal issues utilize words that evoke fuzzy concepts.' 79 By
recognizing the inherent uncertainty of these fuzzy concepts, methods of
accounting for the uncertainty, such as fuzzy special verdict forms, will
hopefully develop to produce more transparent, logical, and accurate
results.
175. See generally supra Parts III & IV.
176. See generally supra Parts III & IV.
177. See generally supra Parts III & IV.
178. See Zadeh, supra note 32.
179. Any legal rule that uses the words "substantial" and "similarity" evokes fuzzy concepts.
Additionally, legal concepts such as "good faith" and "fair dealing" would also raise fuzzy issues.
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